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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court held that it has the jurisdiction to consider an appeal by the State from an order 
granting a prejudgment motion for a new trial in a criminal matter because the plain language of 
NRS 177.015(1)(b) authorizes such an appeal and because unique policy concerns identified in 
State v. Lewis2 do not apply. 
 
Background 
 
 On October 2, 2013, a jury returned verdicts finding respondent Mariann Harris guilty of 
first-degree murder, child abuse, and neglect. Before the sentencing, Harris filed a timely motion 
for a new trial. The district court granted the motion and the State appealed the order under NRS 
177.015(1)(b). The Court ordered the State to show cause why the appeal should not be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Lewis only permits appeals from district court orders 
“resolving post-conviction motions for a new trial”.3  
 
Discussion 
 
The plain language of NRS 177.015 allows for the State to appeal any order granting a new trial 
 
 When a statute contains plain language, the statue’s intention must be deduced from the 
language and the court cannot go beyond it.4 Furthermore, a statue must be read harmoniously 
with other statutes and should not be read to produce unreasonable or absurd results.5 The plain 
language of NRS 177.015 provides that any aggrieved party, whether it is the State or the 
defendant, may appeal “from an order of the district court… granting or refusing a new trial,” 
thus allowing an appeal from an order granting a motion for a new trial and does not limit the 
right to an appeal based on when the motion was filed or when the order resolving it was entered. 
 
State v. Lewis holds that NRS 177.015(1)(b) only authorizes appeals from post-conviction 
motions for a new trial 
 
 The Court held in Lewis that the State did not have a statutory right to appeal from an 
order granting a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 6  The Court analyzed NRS 
177.015(1)(b) in light of NRAP 3A because both contain similar language and NRAP 3A had 
been interpreted to only allow for an appeal from an order denying a post-judgment motion for a 
new trial.7 The Court also determined that “compelling policy justifications” such as ensuring a 
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complete record for appellate review, supported a holding disfavoring appeals from intermediate 
orders and for requiring a final judgment “before this court is vested with jurisdiction.”8 Thus, 
the Court concluded that an order granting a prejudgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not 
appealable “because it is an intermediate order of the district court.”9 Lastly, the Court held that 
the State would not be deprived of its right to appellate review of an erroneous decision by the 
district court because the State “generally suffers no substantial prejudice” when a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is granted because “[t]he State may proceed to trial on the original 
charges or enter into a new plea bargain with the defendant.” Id. at 137, 178 P.3d at 149. 
 The rationale behind Lewis is that despite the plain language of NRS 177.015(1)(b) it 
does not include intermediate orders, which is any order entered before a judgment of conviction. 
This ruling is consistent with the final judgment rule and the policy reasons behind that rule. 
However, this rationale is less persuasive when applied to presentencing orders granting a new 
trial in criminal cases and when considering the different effects of granting a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea versus granting a motion for a new trial. 
 
The unique policy rationale regarding presentence orders granting a new trial in a criminal case 
shows that NRS 177.015(1)(b) should be interpreted differently than NRAP 3A(b)(2) 
 
 A district court has discretion in deciding a motion for a new trial, but that discretion is 
not as “vast” as with a prejudgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, which may be granted for 
any reason that is fair and just.10 The State can likely demonstrate that a district court exceeded 
its discretion in granting a motion for a new trial, particularly given the potential injustice if the 
defendant obtains an acquittal following an improvidently granted new trial. The State can also 
be substantially prejudiced when a motion for a new trial is granted due to the waste of time and 
resources used to conduct the first trial. 
 The Court overruled Lewis to the extent that it would not permit an appeal by the State 
from an order granting a prejudgment motion for a new trial. The financial interests of the State 
in preventing an improvidently granted new trial outweigh the policy justifications in Lewis. 
 
Lewis is not overturned in situations of an appeal of an interlocutory order denying a motion for 
a new trial 
 
 This holding does not authorized a defendant to appeal from a prejudgment order denying 
a motion for a new trial because this is an intermediate order and can be reviewed on appeal from 
the judgment of the conviction.11 This is consistent with the policy considerations in Lewis and 
does not disturb the Lewis holding as it applies to orders denying a prejudgment motion for a 
new trial. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                         
8  Id. at 136. 
9  Id. at 136, 137. 
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 The Court overruled Lewis to the extent that it prohibits the State from pursuing its 
statutory right to appeal a prejudgment order granting a motion for a new trial. The Court held 
that it has jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal of the district court’s order granting Harris’s 
motion for a new trial.  
